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The South African Constitution requires 
that the National Assembly and 
provincial legislatures function in an 
open and transparent manner.2 It is 
indeed a requirement that the National 
Assembly and provincial legislatures 
“must facilitate public involvement in 
the legislative and other processes”. Not 
only is this invitation applicable to the 
full sittings of the National Assembly or 
the legislature, as the case may be, but 
the public is also invited to the engine 
room, namely the meetings of 
committees. The Constitution is clear 
that neither the public nor the media 
may be excluded from a committee 
meeting unless it is reasonable and 
justifiable to do so in an open and 
democratic society. Access to the 
National Assembly and legislatures is 
only controlled to the extent that basic 
                                                 
1 The author would like to express his sincere 
gratitude to Ms Berber Hettinga for her 
assistance in the data analysis of public 
submissions to Parliament presented in this 
paper. 
2 Sections 59 and 118. 
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security requirements need to be met. With such a standing and constitutionally 
guaranteed invitation to South Africans, the question must be asked to what extent this 
has been utilised to embody participatory democracy. 
This paper explores the extent of public participation in the legislative, oversight and 
accountability mandates of Parliament. The legislative mandate refers to the making, 
introducing and amending of laws. The Constitution requires that the executive must 
account to Parliament3 for its actions, policies, expenditure etc. Corder et al explain it as 
follows: “Accountability can be said to require a person to explain and justify - against 
criteria of some kind - their decisions or actions. It also requires that the person goes on 
to make amends for any fault or error and takes steps to prevent its recurrence in the 
future.”4 Oversight has a broader meaning than accountability and includes a wide 
range of activities and initiatives aimed at monitoring the executive.5  While 
accountability and oversight may differ in respect of scope and focus, it is also clear that 
the two are closely linked and mutually reinforcing. The last concept requiring 
clarification is “the public” within the sense of public participation. As will be shown 
below, the concept was used in an expansive manner and few restrictions were placed 
on the inclusion of individuals or organisations in the review undertaken. Some may 
argue that, for example, national human rights institutions, such as the South African 
Human Rights Commission (SAHRC), are state institutions and would thus not be part of 
“the public”. On the other hand it can be argued that the SAHRC has a particular 
mandate to prevent and protect the public against excesses of the state and that this 
places it more closely aligned to the interests of the public than the state. In this paper 
the latter view was followed.  
The first part of the paper presents data on the state of public participation in the 
work of Parliament from which a number of conclusions are drawn. Based on a sample 
of Portfolio Committees of Parliament the paper provides an assessment of the extent to 
which the South African public has utilised the provisions of the Constitution to interact 
with Parliament. A key conclusion is that the current state of public participation is 
almost exclusively focussed on the legislative mandate and that public participation in 
relation to the accountability and oversight mandates is extremely limited. The second 
part of the paper reviews the legal and regulatory framework of public participation in 
the work of Parliament. Particular attention is paid to recent case law that dealt with 
public participation in respect of the legislative mandate. Drawing on this, the third part 
of the paper explores the guidance provided by the courts in respect of public 
participation in the legislative mandate in relation to the oversight and accountability 
mandates.  
2. THE NATURE AND PROFILE OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 2007 – JUNE 
2010 
A quantitative review was undertaken of public participation in the National Parliament 
for the period 2007 to June 2010 based on information made available in the public 
                                                 
3 Section 55(2) 
4 Corder H et al Report on Parliamentary Oversight and Accountability Faculty of Law, University of Cape 
Town (1999) http://www.pmg.org.za/bills/oversight&account.htm Accessed 14 August 2010. 
5 Ibid.  
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domain by the Parliamentary Monitoring Group (PMG). The research was undertaken to 
coincide with the work of the Community Law Centre’s Parliamentary Programme at 
the time. Even though other developments have taken place subsequently (e.g. the 
highly controversial Protection of State Information Bill) the general conclusions drawn 
from the data still holds. These instances of public participation were in the form of 
submissions made by individuals, groups and organisations in response to calls by 
particular parliamentary committees for public hearings on, for example, legislation or 
departmental annual reports. These interactions are regarded as a specific form of 
public participation on legislation and policy development as well as direct oversight, or 
supporting the oversight mandate of a parliamentary committee. As such these are 
probably the most formal type of interaction between parliament and the public on the 
day-to-day work of Parliament. It is acknowledged that other forms of public 
participation also exist, be they of a formal or informal nature, but the focus here is on 
formal engagements between parliament and civil society stakeholders. They are 
important because they provide the public with an avenue for direct in-put on specific 
issues. These formal interactions are also important because they are recorded and in 
the public domain. As such they are manifestations of adherence to the Constitutional 
requirement that Parliament must function in an open and transparent manner. 
Admittedly, the methodology followed in this review has a number of limitations. 
Firstly, PMG may not have recorded all the inputs from the public civil society as some 
entities may only have made a written submission and not oral submissions. 
Furthermore, it is possible that written submissions may have been made subsequent to 
public hearings and such submissions would thus not be recorded as part of the public 
hearings. Thirdly, it is also the case that during committee deliberations on draft 
legislation that a committee may invite participatory discussions between 
representatives from the public and the committee whilst the committee is in session. 
The deliberation by the Portfolio Committee on Justice and Constitutional Development 
on the Child Justice Bill is an example of this.6  
Whilst such interactions are healthy manifestations of participatory democracy, they 
are difficult to quantify and were thus excluded from the analysis below. Fourthly, the 
time period chosen, January 2007 to June 2010, was motivated by a new mechanism 
initiated by PMG to keep track of calls for public hearings and to make these calls 
available to the public. Prior to 2007 this system was not in place. In addition to 
tracking these calls, the meetings of the selected committees were also perused to verify 
if there were any additional instances of public participation. Fifthly, partially motivated 
by the scope of CLC’s Parliamentary Programme7, only a sample of committees were 
included in the analysis. These are the Portfolio Committees on Justice and 
Constitutional Development; Health; Correctional Services; Women, Children, Youth and 
Persons with Disabilities; Social Development; Human Settlement (formerly Housing); 
                                                 
6 See for example the deliberations of the Portfolio Committee on Justice and Constitutional Development 
on the Child Justice Bill on 18 June 2008 where members of the public participated in the deliberations 
(e.g. Dr Gallinetti of the Child Justice Alliance): Parliamentary Monitoring Group Report, Portfolio 
Committee on Justice and Constitutional Development, Child Justice Bill: Further Deliberations,  18 June 
2008  http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20080618-child-justice-bill-further-deliberations Accessed 14 August 
2010. 
7 CLC’s Parliamentary Programme focuses on using international law as a leverage to promote the greater 
realisation of constitutional rights domestically in respect of vulnerable groups. The programme pays 
particular attention to socio-economic rights, gender, children and people deprived of their liberty.  
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Basic Education (formerly Education) and Police. Five other committees were also 
included in the sample, being the Standing Committee on Social Services; the Ad Hoc 
Committee on Protection of Information Bill; Ad Hoc Committee on National Youth 
Development Agency Bill; Ad Hoc Committee on Criminal Law (Forensic Procedures) 
Amendment Bill; and the Standing Committee on Security and Constitutional 
Development. Lastly, the paper aims to provide an overview of the nature and extent of 
public participation in the work of Parliament and does not attempt to assess the impact 
of public participation.  
 
 2.1 Submissions per committee 
Table 1 below sets out the number of submissions made by the public to each of the 
surveyed committees per year. Given the large volume and often the controversiality of 
legislation that the Portfolio Committee on Justice had to deal with over the years, it is 
hardly surprising that during the period under review this Committee dealt with 140 
submissions. The Health Committee also received a significant number of submissions; 
86 in total. A further noticeable trend is the total number of submissions, which 
fluctuated from 114 in 2007 to 183 in 2008, but in 2009 dropped to 110. The decrease 
in 2009 can in all likelihood be ascribed to the general elections held in that year which 
shortened the parliamentary programme. It was also less likely that the outgoing 
Parliament would in an election year busy itself with extensive legislative and other 
processes. The first six months of 2010 saw comparatively few submissions made to the 
selected committees, although it is known that in July 2010 a number of submission 
were made to, for example, the Portfolio Committees on Police and Correctional 
Services.  
 
Table 1 Number of submissions made per committee 





PC Justice 24 76 40 
 
140 
PC Health 44 32 5 5 86 
PC Women, Children, Youth and Persons with 




PC Correctional Services 14 6 11 
 
31 
PC Social Development 14 11 1 5 31 
Ad Hoc Committee on National Youth Development 






7 12 7 26 
PC Human Settlement (previously Housing) 6 9 
 
1 16 





PC Basic Education (previously Education) 9 
   
9 
Ad Hoc Committee on Criminal Law (Forensic 
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SC Security and Constitutional Development 3 
   
3 
TOTAL 114 183 110 18 425 
 
2.2 Focal areas of submissions 
The analysis of submissions also addressed the focus of the submissions and this is 
presented in Table 2. From the data it is clear that a small number of focal areas 
attracted significant public participation. The proposed closure of the Scorpions 
attracted the highest number of submissions (37 in total) followed by the National 
Youth Development Agency and the 11-Year Review of the Implementation of the 
Domestic Violence Act (28 each). More than 20 submissions were also received in 
respect of the Protection of Personal Information Bill [B9 - 2009]; the Medicines and 
Related Substances Amendment Bill [B44-2008]; and the Choice on Termination of 
Pregnancy Amendment Bill [B 21-2007]. Controversiality and overt politicisation of 
legislation and policy, and organised pressure groups (i.e. 11-Year Review of the 
Implementation of the Domestic Violence Act) are evidently strong drivers of public 
participation in the work of Parliament. A consequence of this may be that public 
participation may indeed be sporadic and opportunistic instead of more sustained. It is 
also clear that public involvement in Parliament has been primarily focused on the 
legislative mandate of Parliament compared to oversight and accountability mandates.  
 
Table 2 Focus of submissions for selected committees, 2007 to June 2010 
Focus of submission Frequency 
Scorpions Closure 37 
National Youth Development Agency; 11 year Implementation of the Domestic 
Violence Act  
28 
Protection of Personal Information Bill [B9 - 2009]  26 
 Medicines and Related Substances Amendment Bill [B44-2008] 23 
Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Amendment Bill [B 21-2007] 22 
Traditional Courts Bill [B15-2008]; Criminal Law (Forensic Procedures) Amendment 
Bill [B2-2009] 
19 
Tobacco Products Control Amendment Bill [B24-2006] 17 
Criminal Law (Sentencing) Amendment Bill [B15-2007]; Children's Amendment Bill 
[B19B-2006] 
13 
Child Justice Bill 12 
Tobacco Control Amendment Bill [B7-2008] 11 
Protection of Information Bill [B28-2008] 10 
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Focus of submission Frequency 
Cross-boundary Municipalities Laws Bill [B3-2009] & Constitution 16th Amendment 
Bill [B1-2009] 
9 
Constitution 13th Amendment Bill [24-2007]; Education Laws Amendment Bill [B33-
2007]; Housing Development Agency Bill [B1-2008]; Correctional Services 
Amendment Bill 
8 
DCS Past Activities; Social Development Budget 2008/2009 6 
Administrative Action Judicial Review Rules; DCS Budget 2007/2008; Parliamentary 
Research Unit& Auditor-General analysis; Prevention of and Treatment for Substance 
Abuse Bill [B12-2008]; Second-hand Goods Bill [B2 - 2008] 
5 
Traditional Health Practitioners Bill [B 20-2007]; Social Assistance Amendment Bill 
[B5 - 2010]; State of Academic Health Complexes: by Universities of Western Cape, 
Cape Town, Stellenbosch, Free State Health Faculties; Strategic Planning Workshop; 
Safety and security of farmers, farm workers and farm dwellers: stakeholders' 
briefings 
4 
Social Housing Amendment Bill [B29-2007]; Judicial Matters Amendment Bill [B48-
2008]; Judicial Service Commission Amendment Bill; DCS Budget 2008/2009; Bonitas, 
Discovery Health, Fedhealth Medical Schemes on operations, services and charges: 
briefing 
3 
Jurisdiction of Regional Courts Bill [B48-2007]; Renaming of High Courts Bill [B5-
2008]; General Laws Amendment Bill [B65-2008]; Medical Parole & Deaths in Prison; 
Children's Rights: UNICEF and Heinrich Boll Foundation: presentation; SAPS Budget 
2010/2011; SAPS Budget 2008/2009 
2 
 Other (see endnote 1)1 1 
 
2.3 Category of interaction 
The focus on the legislative mandate of Parliament is clearly illustrated in Table 3, with 
335 (79%) of the 425 submissions made focussing on bills under consideration by 
Parliament. Submissions on budget votes totalled 29 (6.8%) and departmental annual 
reports 5 (1.2%).  
 
Table 3 Category of interaction 
Type of interaction Frequency 
Legislation 335 
Departmental budget 29 
Ad hoc (DVA 11-year review) 28 
Expert Briefings 7 
Departmental annual report 5 
Ad hoc (State of Academic Health Complexes) 4 
Ad hoc (Strategic Planning Workshop) 4 
Ad hoc (Safety and security of farmers, farm workers and farm dwellers: stakeholders' 
briefings) 
4 
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Type of interaction Frequency 
Ad hoc (Bonitas, Discovery Health, Fedhealth Medical Schemes on operations, services 
and charges: briefing) 
3 
Ad hoc (Children's Rights: UNICEF and Heinrich Boll Foundation: presentation) 2 
Ad hoc (Community Concerns About New Tsolo Hospital) 1 
Ad hoc (Champions of a HIV free generation: briefing) 1 
Ad hoc (Hospital Association of South Africa briefing) 1 
Ad hoc (UNICEF's programmes & future work plan with Committee) 1 
Total 425 
 
Matching the committee to the type of interaction also showed that certain committees 
focussed exclusively on legislation (e.g. Portfolio Committee on Justice and the two 
Standing Committees). The Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services is the only 
committee that held public hearings on the annual reports of the department 
concerned. It is also noteworthy that during the period under review that the Portfolio 
Committee on Justice and Constitutional Development never held public hearings on the 
budget vote for its department. The Department of Women, Children, Youth and 
Persons with Disabilities came into being in May 2009 and it may therefore not have 
been possible or practical to hold public hearings on the budget vote and, further, as at 
the time of writing an annual report of this department had not been tabled. It is 
furthermore noteworthy that, compared to their counterparts in the National Assembly, 
the Standing Committees of the NCOP very seldom called for public hearings and when 
it was done, these all related to legislation as is required by their mandate.   
 












PC Justice 140     140 
PC Health 75   10 1 86 
PC Correctional Services 8 5 14  4 31 
PC Women, Children, Youth 
and Persons with 
Disabilities 
   34  34 
PC Social Development 22  7 1 1 31 
PC Human Settlement  13  3   16 
PC Basic Education 
(previously Education) 
8  1   9 
PC Police 17  4 4 1 26 
Standing 
Committees 
SC Social Services 4     4 
SC Security and 
Constitutional Development 
3     3 
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Ad Hoc Committee on 
Protection of Information 
Bill 
10     10 
Ad Hoc Committee on 
National Youth 
Development Agency Bill 
28     28 
Ad Hoc Committee on 
Criminal Law (Forensic 
Procedures) Amendment 
Bill 
7     7 
 Total 290 5 29 49 7 380 
 
2.4 Submissions by organisation type  
The overwhelming majority of submissions to the selected committees were made by 
NGOs; a total of 181, followed by individuals (83); private sector groups (32) and 
industry bodies (28), as shown in Table 5 below. The relatively high number of 
submissions made by individuals does indicate that such submissions are indeed an 
avenue for public interaction with Parliament. NGOs make the most frequent use of this 
form of interaction, as indicated in Table 5.  
 




Private Sector 32 
Industry body 28 
Organised Labour 24 
Academic Institution 17 
Political Interest Group 14 
Professional Body 11 
NHRI 9 
Intergovernmental agency 6 
Youth Commission 6 
Community representative 4 
Traditional Council 2 
Provincial Legislature 2 
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Table 6 sets out the number of submissions per organisation or representative and 
provides additional detail to Table 5 above. Due to the high number of submissions in 
certain categories, these were grouped, namely: individuals; private sector; industry 
bodies; academic institutions; and professional bodies. The highest number of 
submissions were made by individuals (83), followed by private sector representatives 
(32); industry bodies (28); academic institutions (17); and professional bodies (10). At 
the level of individual organisations, a significant number of submissions were made by 
the Civil Society Prison Reform Initiative (9); SA Human Rights Commission (9); 
POPCRU (8); NICRO (6); UNICEF (6); Youth Commission (6); CSVR (5); Centre for 
Constitutional Rights (5); and the Public Servants Association of South Africa (5). 
 
Table 6 Number of submissions per representative  
Name Number of 
submissions 
Individual 83 
Private Sector 32 
Industry body 28 
Academic Institution 17 
Professional Body 10 
Civil Society Prison Reform Initiative (CSPRI) 9 
SA Human Rights Commission 9 
Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union (POPCRU) 8 
Intergovernmental agency; NICRO; UNICEF; Youth Commission 6 
CSVR; Centre for Constitutional Rights (CFCR); Public Servants Association of 
South Africa (PSA) 
5 
Community representative; Women's Legal Centre; Open Democracy Advice 
Centre (ODAC) 
4 
Tshwaranang Legal Advocacy Centre; Legal Resource Centre; Children's 
Institute; Southern African Catholic Bishops' Conference (SACBC); Institute for 
Democracy in South Africa (IDASA); AIDS Law Project and Treatment Action 
Campaign Joint Submission; Business Against Crime; Congress of South African 
Trade Unions (COSATU); Institute for Security Studies (ISS); Black Sash 
3 
Traditional Council; South African Council of Churches; Association of Regional 
Magistrates; Southern African Catholic Bishops’ Conference; Resources Aimed 
at the Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect (RAPCAN); Cape Town 
Association for the Physically Disabled; Justice Alliance South Africa (JASA); 
Doctors for Life International; Christian Action Network; Mosaic; Democratic 
Alliance (DA); ANC Youth League (ANCYL); The DNA Project; National Council 
Against Smoking; Khulisa; South African Police Union (SAPU) 
2 
Other (see endnote 2)2  1 
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2.5 Some observations 
Even though there are some limitations to the data presented in the above, some trends 
are nonetheless clearly visible. It is firstly clear that the majority of instances of public 
involvement in the work of Parliament centres on the legislative mandate. Nearly 80% 
of the submissions made were in connection with legislation being considered by a 
Portfolio Committee, Standing Committee or Ad Hoc Committee. Submissions more 
closely related to the oversight mandate, such as on budget votes and annual reports, 
were indeed rare. In fact only one Portfolio Committee, Correctional Services, had public 
hearings on the annual report of its department. Public hearings on the budget votes 
were done more frequently, but it should be noted that neither the Justice nor Health 
Portfolio Committees had public hearings on the budget votes of their departments 
during the period under review. While the legislative task of Parliament is important 
and the extent of public consultation in this regard should be acknowledged, it is also 
true that maintaining oversight and holding the executive accountable are equally 
important tasks of Parliament. This issue will be discussed further in the following 
section. 
It is also noteworthy that certain issues attracted significant public participation. In 
this regard the closure of the Scorpions; the National Youth Development Agency Bill; 
the 11-year Review of the Implementation of the Domestic Violence Act; the Protection 
of Personal Information Bill; the Medicines and Related Substances Amendment Bill; 
and the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Amendment Bill stand out. In the case of 
the Scorpions closure and the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Amendment Bill, 
highly controversial issues were being dealt with and the considerable amount of public 
involvement can be expected. The review of the implementation of the Implementation 
of the Domestic Violence Act resulted in the mobilisation of a well organised interest 
group which has spent a considerable amount of time and energy over the years to 
promote women’s rights and to lobby the state for effective services for victims of 
domestic violence. The National Youth Development Agency Bill attracted submissions 
in particular from the youth wings of political parties and interest groups. 
A consequence of the legislation-focussed instances of public involvement is that they 
are episodic; once the legislation is adopted, the process comes to an end. This may also 
explain the large number of NGOs (111 in total) that made only one submission during 
the period under review (see Table 6 above). The review of the Domestic Violence Act is 
the only instance where public in-puts were called for in respect of reviewing the 
implementation of legislation.  
The focus on legislation not only draws attention away from the oversight and 
accountability mandates, but it also gives very specific foci to the involvement of the 
public in the processes of Parliament. It can thus be argued that if a particular problem 
or issue is not addressed in specific draft legislation, it is unlikely that it will come on 
the agenda for public hearings. By contrast, if a committee calls for public hearings on 
the annual report of a department, as the Portfolio Committee on Correctional services 
did, it enables members of the public to place nearly any issue related to the prison 
system on the agenda. In this manner the committee will receive a much wider 
exposure to the sentiments of the public.  
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It remains a relatively small number of public representatives that engage with 
Parliament on a consistent or even sporadic basis. During the period under review only 
nine organisations8 made more than five submissions to any of the committees 
reviewed. It then appears that the perception by some Members of Parliament that it is 
frequently the same organisations making submissions9 is not entirely without 
foundation. The organisations that fall in this category are also, in general, well-
established and with sufficient resources. Of this group two are labour unions, two are 
oversight structures, one is a UN agency, and the remainder are well established NGOs. 
In the discussion that follows the legal and regulatory framework is explored and 
particular attention is paid to the apparent neglect of Parliament’s oversight mandate, 
and more particularly the public’s involvement or lack thereof. 
3.  THE LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK GOVERNING PUBLIC 
PARTICIPATION IN THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 
Participatory democracy should be seen as something more than casting one’s vote in 
an election and the right to be a political candidate. This much is clear from article 25 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which South Africa 
ratified in 1998, giving every citizen, in addition to the rights to vote and to be elected, 
the right “to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen 
representatives”. Public participation in democratic processes thus goes beyond 
participation in elections and extends into other affairs of the democratic state. This 
much is made clear by the Human Rights Committee:  
“The conduct of public affairs, referred to in paragraph (a), is a broad concept which relates 
to the exercise of political power, in particular the exercise of legislative, executive and 
administrative powers. It covers all aspects of public administration, and the formulation and 
implementation of policy at international, national, regional and local levels. The allocation of 
powers and the means by which individual citizens exercise the right to participate in the 
conduct of public affairs protected by article 25 should be established by the constitution and 
other laws.”10  
How the public participates in public affairs and the particular modalities to achieve this 
should thus be described in domestic law.  
The South African Constitution is clear on this and it is indeed a requirement that the 
National Assembly, National Council of Provinces (NCOP) and provincial legislatures 
“must facilitate public involvement in the legislative and other processes of the 
Assembly and its committees.”11 Not only is this invitation applicable to the full sittings 
of the National Assembly, but the public is also invited to the meetings of committees. 
Furthermore, no individual or the media may be excluded from a committee meeting 
                                                 
8 These are: Civil Society Prison Reform Initiative (CSPRI); SA Human Rights Commission; Police and 
Prisons Civil Rights Union (POPCRU); NICRO; UNICEF; Youth Commission; Centre for the Study of 
Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR); Centre for Constitutional Rights (CFCR); and the Public Servants 
Association of South Africa (PSA). 
9 The author has engaged actively with specifically the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services since 
2005 and this was a view expressed by a number of Committee Members in informal discussions as well 
as formal deliberations during committee sessions.  
10 UN Human Rights Committee General Comment 25 CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7 (1996) para 5. 
11 Sections 59, 72, 118. 
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unless there are reasonable grounds to do so in an open and democratic society.12 
Parliament is also mandated to develop and make its own rules and procedures 
pertaining to its business, but “with due regard to representative and participatory 
democracy, accountability, transparency and public involvement”.13 Parliament is 
therefore left with a considerable amount of discretion to determine how it will 
facilitate public participation.14 
The Constitution is also clear that public participation should be facilitated in respect 
of the legislative and other processes of the National Assembly, NCOP and provincial 
legislatures. The “other processes” are not described in the Constitution, but can be 
inferred to mean at least the functions that the three institutions are mandated by the 
Constitution to fulfil. In respect of the National Assembly, NCOP and the provincial 
legislatures these are similar and relate to the consideration of tabled legislation as well 
as that it may initiate or prepare legislation, with the exception of money bills.15 The 
National Assembly and the provincial legislatures have the additional responsibility to 
hold the executive accountable and exercise oversight over the national or provincial 
organs of state, as the case may be.16 The “other processes” referred to in the 
Constitution must therefore be understood to mean at least the oversight and 
accountability mandates of the National Assembly and the provincial legislatures. 
Two recent decisions from the Constitutional Court dealt with public participation in 
the legislative processes of Parliament and the provincial legislatures.17 It is in 
particular in Doctors for Life International v The Speaker of the National Assembly and 
Others (hereafter Doctors for Life)18 that the Constitutional Court dealt in detail with a 
                                                 
12 Section 59(2). 
13 Section 57(1)(b). 
14 Doctors for Life International v The Speaker of the National Assembly and Others (CCT 12/05) para 123 
“Save in relation to the specific duty to allow the public and the media to attend the sittings of the 
committees, the Constitution has deliberately refrained from prescribing to Parliament and the provincial 
legislatures what method of public participation should be followed in a given case.” 
15 Sections 55, 68 and 114. 
16 Sections 55, 68 and 114. 
17 Doctors for Life and Matatiele Municipality and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and 
Others 2006 (5) BCLR 622 (CC).   
18 In the Doctors for Life International (DFL) decision, DFL had applied directly to the Constitutional Court, 
challenging the constitutional validity of four Bills. DFL argued that Parliament failed to fulfil its 
constitutional obligation to facilitate public involvement when it passed four Bills, all of which related to 
health issues. These Bills were: the Sterilisation Amendment Bill; the Traditional Health Practitioners Bill; 
the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Amendment Bill; and the Dental Technicians Amendment Bill. 
However, DFL’s complaint was confined to the process followed by the National Council of Provinces 
(NCOP). The Court had to consider four questions: first, whether the Constitutional Court is the only court 
which can hear a matter of this nature; second, whether it is competent for the Court to grant declaratory 
relief in respect of the proceedings of Parliament; third, the nature and scope of the constitutional 
obligation of a legislative organ of state to facilitate public involvement in the law-making process; and 
fourth, whether on the facts of the case the NCOP complied with that obligation when passing the health 
legislation under challenge, and, if it did not, the consequences of its failure.  
Turning to the question whether the NCOP has complied with its duty to facilitate public involvement in 
relation to the Traditional Health Practitioners Act, and the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy 
Amendment Act, Ngcobo J, found that: a) these two Bills had generated great public interest at the NCOP 
as evidenced by requests for public hearings; b) in the light of these requests, the NCOP decided that 
public hearings would be held in the provinces and advised the interested groups of this fact; c) the 
nature of these Bills was such that public hearings should be held; d) a majority of the provinces did not 
hold hearings on these Bills because of insufficient time and this fact was drawn to the attention of the 
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number of critical issues relating to public participation in the legislative processes and 
it is necessary to dwell on this somewhat.  
Given that Parliament has considerable discretion in complying with section 72(1)(a) 
of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court was quick to point out that whether or not 
Parliament has complied with the requirement of public participation will vary from 
case to case, but that Parliament must “act reasonably in carrying out its duty to 
facilitate public involvement in its processes”.19 In Doctors for Life, Ngcobo J cites Sachs J 
approvingly from an earlier decision by the same court:  
“The forms of facilitating an appropriate degree of participation in the law-making process 
are indeed capable of infinite variation. What matters is that at the end of the day a 
reasonable opportunity is offered to members of the public and all interested parties to 
know about the issues and to have an adequate say. What amounts to a reasonable 
opportunity will depend on the circumstances of each case.”20  
To determine what is reasonable depends on the facts and circumstances of a particular 
case.21 Reasonableness remains, however, an objective standard based on a number of 
factors and these are set out in the Doctors for Life decision. Firstly, the court attached 
particular importance to the nature and importance of the legislation as well as the 
intensity of its impact on the public. Secondly, consideration must be given to the 
practicalities of the law-making process, such as time and costs involved, but that saving 
time and money is not an excuse for limiting or diluting public participation. In short, 
consideration must be given to the legislation’s content, importance and urgency.22 
Ultimately, the court had to assess if Parliament fulfilled its duty to facilitate public 
involvement by, firstly providing meaningful opportunities for public participation in 
law-making and, secondly, whether measures were taken to ensure that people had the 
ability to take advantage of the opportunities provided.23 The Constitutional Court 
therefore saw the right to political participation giving rise to the positive right to 
participate in political decision-making, but simultaneously imposing a duty on the 
State to facilitate public participation by ensuring this right to be realised.24 
The Court proceeded to give further guidance on how Parliament should fulfil this 
duty and emphasised that merely “allowing” public participation, under the particular 
circumstances, is not enough, but that measures must be taken to facilitate public 
participation.  Parliament must provide notice of and information about the legislation 
under consideration and the available opportunities for public participation. To this end 
it may be necessary to provide education to build capacity for public participation. The 
Court was, however, not prescriptive in respect of the specific actions to be taken and 
                                                                                                                                                        
NCOP; and e) the NCOP did not hold public hearings. In the light of this, Ngcobo J held that the failure by 
the NCOP to hold public hearings in relation to the Traditional Health Practitioners Act and the Choice on 
Termination of Pregnancy Amendment Act was unreasonable. He therefore concluded that the NCOP did 
not comply with its obligation to facilitate public involvement in relation to these two Acts as 
contemplated by section 72(1)(a) of the Constitution. 
19 Doctors for Life para 125.  
20 Minister of Health and Another NO v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Others (Treatment Action 
Campaign and Another as Amicus Curiae) 2006 (2) SA 311 (CC); 2006 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) at paras 111-3. 
21 Doctors for Life para 127. 
22 Doctors for Life para 128. 
23 Doctors for Life para 129. 
24 Doctors for Life para 129. 
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clearly said that public participation exists on a continuum that ranges from providing 
information and building awareness to partnering in decision-making.25 In King and 
Others v Attorneys Fidelity Fund Board of Control and Another (hereafter King case)26 the 
Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) was even more descriptive of public involvement: 
“‘Public involvement’ is necessarily an inexact concept, with many possible facets, and the 
duty to ‘facilitate’ it can be fulfilled not in one, but in many different ways. Public 
involvement might include public participation through the submission of commentary and 
representations: but that is neither definitive nor exhaustive of its content. The public may 
become ‘involved’ in the business of the National Assembly as much by understanding and 
being informed of what it is doing as by participating directly in those processes. It is plain 
that by imposing on Parliament the obligation to facilitate public involvement in its 
processes the Constitution sets a base standard, but then leaves Parliament significant 
leeway in fulfilling it.”27  
Based on these cases it can be concluded that Parliament has now been fortified with 
considerable guidance from the courts as to what is required from it to meet the 
requirements of public participation in the legislative process. 
From the above it is plain that Parliament has a very clear duty to facilitate public 
involvement in its legislative and other processes and that it must provide the public 
with meaningful opportunities to exercise this right. Furthermore, Parliament has wide 
discretion in taking measures to meet this obligation. The Constitutional Court did, 
however, balance the right to public involvement in the processes of Parliament with 
                                                 
25 Doctors for Life para 129. 
26 In the King decision the appellants, disappointed investors, had unsuccessfully sought in a division of 
the High Court to challenge a statute of Parliament that precluded them from obtaining compensation for 
their losses from the Attorneys’ Fidelity Fund. They challenged the validity of the statute which amended 
the Attorneys Act 53 of 1979. They contended that section 59 of the Constitution had not been satisfied. 
That provision requires inter alia that “the National Assembly must facilitate public involvement in the 
legislative and other processes of the Assembly and its committees”. Appellants contended that there had 
been insufficient public consultation about the statute in question. Since Parliament had not involved the 
public sufficiently in the process of adopting the amending Act, it was contended, the statute was invalid. 
They appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal. In 1998 Parliament amended the Attorneys Act 53 of 
1979 to preclude recovery from the Attorneys Fidelity Fund of moneys deposited with an attorney not in 
the usual course of practice, but to invest on behalf of a client. In striking the case from the roll with costs, 
the Supreme Court of Appeal pointed out that in terms of section 167(4)(e) of the Constitution, only the 
Constitutional Court had jurisdiction to decide that Parliament had failed to fulfil a constitutional 
obligation.  
While it was so that, subject to the Constitutional Court’s confirmation the Supreme Court of Appeal and 
the High Courts had jurisdiction to declare that a statute was constitutionally invalid, it had to be borne in 
mind that invalidity could result from different reasons. If it were contended that Act was invalid because 
Parliament had failed to comply with a procedural prerequisite in enacting it (for instance, if a Bill had not 
obtained a majority of votes), or because a statute as enacted violated a provision of the Bill of Rights, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal and the High Courts would have jurisdiction to grant an order declaring it 
invalid. But a statute might also be invalid because Parliament had so completely violated an obligation 
placed upon it by the Constitution that it ceased to be or to function as the body envisaged in the 
Constitution. In such an extreme case Parliament would lack the power to pass legislation under the 
Constitution. However, Appellants had not made out such a case. They admitted that there had been 
public involvement. They did not claim that Parliament had ceased to function entirely as the body 
entrusted with legislative capacity under the Constitution. Their claim therefore fell short of making out a 
case for legislative invalidity. Even if they had made out a sufficient case, only the Constitutional Court 
would have power to grant them the relief they sought.  
27 King and Others v Attorneys Fidelity Fund Board of Control and Another 2006(4) BCLR 462 (SCA) para 22 
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the need to respect parliamentary institutional autonomy.28 Public involvement is 
therefore not intended to disrespect or dilute the fact that the public elected its 
representatives to form a parliament, but rather to strengthen it through respectful and 
active engagements and mutual sharing of information. 
4. THE OVERSIGHT MANDATE 
The preceding section dealt with the legal framework and subsequent case law that 
focussed on public involvement in respect of the legislative mandate of Parliament. 
There is unfortunately no case law that has dealt with public involvement in respect of 
the “other processes” of Parliament and more specifically, the oversight and 
accountability mandates of Parliament. In view of this lacuna, if indeed one, the question 
must be asked if the guidance in respect of public involvement in the legislative 
processes of Parliament, as presented in the Doctors for Life and King cases, can be 
applied to the oversight mandate of Parliament. Following from this, it must then be 
asked what such guidelines may look like in respect of the oversight mandate, and what 
would be practical examples in this regard.  
In Doctors for Life the Court emphasised the public’s right to be involved in the 
legislative and other processes of Parliament.29 It is important to note that this right is 
not restricted to only the legislative mandate of Parliament but extends to any other 
matters that Parliament may deal with and specifically the oversight and accountability 
mandates. In King the SCA sketched the opposite of such a people’s parliament:  
“Its antithesis is a body that separates itself from and excludes the public, is indifferent to 
their participation and interests, and conducts its business concealed from the public eye. 
Were that ever to occur it would negate one of the essential pillars of the Constitution, with 
fundamental implications not only for Parliament’s legitimacy, but for its legislative 
capacity.”30  
The right to public involvement in the work of Parliament is what gives the South 
African Parliament its particular character. 
In the discussion following below the emphasis will be placed on the oversight 
mandate of Parliament as this has been identified as a particular shortcoming in the 
above survey. Moreover, effective oversight and transparency are requirements for 
effective accountability.  It also appears to be commonly accepted that since 1994 
Parliament’s focus was indeed on its legislative mandate as described in 2007 by Ms 
Nomonde Keswa, Manager, Legislation and Oversight Division:  
“There is a shift in emphasis from initiating, amending and passing legislation to increasing 
the effectiveness of Parliament’s oversight capacity. Parliament has developed an Oversight 
and Accountability Model, which provides for the strengthening of existing parliamentary 
oversight practices, as well as the establishment of new processes and structures to enhance 
this capacity.”31  
                                                 
28 Doctors for Life para 146. 
29 Doctors for Life 145. 
30 Doctors for Life para 20. 
31 Parliament’s 2007 Reflections, December 16 Cape Town: Parliament of South Africa (2007) 9 
http://www.parliament.gov.za/content/Reflections_Final_12pg%209.pdf Accessed 14 August 2010. 
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It can thus be concluded that whilst Parliament is aware that its oversight mandate has 
been neglected, it will also require the setting up of new procedures and practices to 
develop this fully, and that the role of public involvement in this has not yet been 
developed. 
At this point it is also relevant to make some comments about the constituency 
system in operation in South Africa. It may be argued that the public can also be 
involved in the work of Parliament through their individual constituency 
representatives. However, the proportional system in South Africa militates against this 
approach and the Electoral Task Team, appointed by President Mbeki in 2002, found 
evidence of considerable perceived distance between the electorate and individual 
elected representatives.32 In view of this problem, the direct involvement of the public 
in the processes of Parliament becomes all the more important.  
Given that oversight encompasses something more than accountability, the question 
then arises as to how Parliament can facilitate public participation in exercising 
oversight. In the final analysis what really matters is, as Sachs J pointed out above, 
whether the public had a reasonable opportunity to participate in respect of the 
oversight mandate. Since oversight is essentially aimed at monitoring the executive on a 
broad front, once off opportunities and events for public involvement may face 
challenges in meeting this requirement. For example, the NCOP’s Taking Parliament to 
the People Programme, launched in 2002, has increasingly become “event-oriented”, but 
more importantly, the information provided by the public to parliamentarians under 
this programme (and under the People’s Parliament Programme) does not seem to find 
its way into the work of the portfolio committees.33  
A further mechanism that the public can use is petitions as provided for in the 
Constitution.34 Despite its potential, petitions appear to be fairly unknown and thus 
seldom utilised.35 Petitions are also, by their nature, very specific and frequently 
problem-driven and, as such, may not be an effective monitoring tool unless it is used 
frequently and in a consistent manner. This will require a certain measure of 
coordination and political skill. It also appears that Parliament has not set up the 
necessary mechanism to deal with petitions.36  It is thus, from the available literature, 
not clear what Parliament would do with petitions.  
The task of oversight centres, in its crudest form, on monitoring the strategic 
priorities of the executive and the utilisation of resources allocated thereto with the aim 
to ensure that resources are being used effectively and efficiently to achieve the stated 
aims. In this regard two instruments stand out, namely the budget vote (read together 
with the department’s strategic plan) and the departmental annual report. The budget 
vote and strategic plan, read together, set out a multi-year plan for the department 
concerned. Based on this, Parliament will approve, amend or reject the proposed budget 
for the year. In fulfilling this duty, the committees of Parliament are obligated, by virtue 
of the Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act (Act 9 of 2009), to 
assess the performance of each national department with reference to the following: the 
                                                 
32 Report of the Electoral Task Team Cape Town: Electoral Task Team (2003) 18. 
33 Report of the Independent Panel Assessment of Parliament Cape Town: Parliament of South Africa (2009) 
64. 
34 Sections 17 and 56(d). 
35 Report of the Independent Panel Assessment of Parliament (n 32 above) 63. 
36 Report of the Independent Panel Assessment of Parliament (n 32 above) 63. 
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medium term estimates of expenditure; its strategic priorities; measurable objectives; 
prevailing strategic plans; the expenditure report published by National Treasury; 
financial statements; annual report; the report from the Standing Committee on Public 
Accounts (SCOPA); and any other information presented to or requested by any house 
of Parliament.37 While Parliament may undertake other activities to exercise its 
oversight mandate, such as inspection visits to government facilities (e.g. prisons, 
hospitals and police stations), the duties imposed by the Money Bills Amendment 
Procedure and Related Matters Act are a very clear and tangible operationalisation of 
the oversight mandate.  
While section 5 of the Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act 
does not require Parliament to hold public hearings in respect of the departmental 
budget votes, section 10(8) of the same Act requires that the Standing Rules of 
Parliament must provide for the Committee on Appropriations to hold public hearings 
in respect of appropriation bills. Apart from this provision, the portfolio committees are 
entitled to consider any other information presented to or requested by it. Facilitating 
public involvement in the Portfolio Committees’ assessment of the budget appears to be 
of great importance for a number of reasons. 
It will firstly give a real sense of participatory democracy by involving the public in 
the budget assessment process as set out in section 5 of the Money Bills Amendment 
Procedure and Related Matters Act, as described above. Facilitating public involvement 
at this level gives real meaning to participation in political decision-making as described 
by the Human Rights Committee in General Comment 2538 and in the King case where 
Sachs J refers specifically to the public “participating directly in those processes.”39 
Secondly, the substance of the issue being dealt with, namely the allocation of public 
funds and the monitoring of their utilisation, is of great public importance and intensity 
because it has a direct impact on the public. A variable the Constitutional Court attached 
great prominence to in Doctors for Life (para 128), is assessing whether the public had a 
reasonable opportunity for participation in the law-making process.  
The same principle applies here: the allocation of funds and their utilisation has high 
“intensity of impact” and the public should thus be given a reasonable opportunity to 
“say its say”. The strategic plans of government departments, the reporting on the use of 
funds in the past and the reports from other oversight institutions (e.g. SCOPA and the 
Auditor General) are extremely valuable sets of information not only to the portfolio 
committees but also to the public for the simple reason that they reflect whether the 
current government is living up to its election promises. Engaging the public on these 
issues is critical for assessing the veracity of the reports government submits to 
Parliament, but also to scrutinise the future plans of the government in power. 
Parliament should also accept that, if it is to exercise oversight effectively, it cannot rely 
only on the information supplied by government departments and other institutions of 
state, but that its information base will be greatly enriched by engaging the public in 
respect of its oversight mandate.   
In the preceding analysis of public participation in selected committees, the evidence 
showed that nearly 80% of the engagements were focused on law-making and that 
                                                 
37 Section 5 of the Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act, No 9 of 2009. 
38 See footnote 11. 
39 King and Others para 22. 
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these instances were very specialised and focussed. The conclusion was drawn that this 
shaped the agenda for Parliament-public interactions in a particular manner that 
limited the flow of information. Therefore, and as a third reason, by engaging the public 
on the strategic direction, budget and performance of departments, the portfolio 
committees will open themselves up to a much broader range of issues. In effect this 
will democratise the agenda for interactions between Parliament and the public, with 
the possible consequence that the portfolio committees’ interactions with their relevant 
departments may change in substance to reflect (more accurately) the issues raised by 
the public. The value here lies not only in that a citizen has a right to engage Parliament, 
but that he or she has a right to engage on a subject of their choosing. Facilitating public 
involvement in the oversight mandate enables this and thus counters an inherent 
limitation in respect of the legislative mandate. 
Public involvement in the oversight mandate is important for a fourth reason: it 
provides Parliament with a view from below; a view that is seldom found in 
departmental annual reports and as such represents an alternative or shadow “report”. 
The public is ultimately in the best position to state whether services are being 
rendered and infrastructure being erected or not in a particular area.   
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
The review presented here that public participation in the work of Parliament has 
firstly been limited by and large to law reform and, further, that the greatest intensity of 
public involvement occurred when Parliament dealt with particularly controversial 
legislation. Within specific sectors it is also apparent that a relatively small number of 
organisations engage regularly with Parliament on a number of issues and the majority 
of interactions are once-off and related to specific pieces of legislation.  
Defining a new legal order for South Africa based on the Constitution after 1994 
required Parliament to finalise hundreds of pieces of legislation in a relatively short 
period of time. In completing this momentous task, the oversight mandate of Parliament 
was neglected and consequently public involvement in respect of Parliament’s oversight 
mandate.  However, the lessons learnt and jurisprudence that has emerged from the 15-
year focus on legislation has proven to provide valuable guidelines in deepening 
participatory democracy in South Africa although these cases dealt with public 
participation and the legislative mandate.  The right to public participation in the work 
of Parliament has now been consolidated based on the Doctors for Life and King 
decisions. The next challenge is for the public to utilise this right in order to support and 
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